No Japanese strike planes were warming up on deck." But weren't they on deck nonetheless, receiving fuel for a second attack on something when the US carrier planes attacked (regardless whether engines were running)? Japanese fuel lines were like big long firecracker fuses. At some point in the war. American carriers under attack found a way to inject CO2 into fuel lines to prevent fire damage, so I can believe the Japanese navy didn't prioritize damage control in the same way.
Some American pilots reported planes on the deck, others did not. On the decks were the CAP planes landing and taking off. The Zero had a weak MG, to down our bombers they had to use cannon. Zeroes carried very little cannon ammo, so planes had to land and refill cannons.
The Japanese did not prepare bombers on deck while take-offs landing. It was a matter 9f doctrine and safety, they lacked the crash barriers we had. Because fighters were taking off and landing, the bombers stayed below decks.
It also too a full half hour to warm up engines of the bombers. Since the bombers were below deck, it was at least 30 minutes to take off.
The bombers were fueled below decks, he discussed the CO2 issue.
"including Midway we had more planes." Well, maybe, but how many of the land based aircraft on Midway were comparable to the aircraft on the Japanese navy's carriers for purposes of attacking ships (not land targets), I doubt if Midway's B-17's, PBY's and obsolete fighters were relevant threats to the Japanese navy especially after the initial runway damage. Does the book talk about that? Maybe I'm wrong. (Sheer numbers don't automatically matter so much.)
Yes, most of our land planes were inferior. But a couple points on that. They did keep the Japanese carriers running from their attacks. Japan's fleet was weak in AA fire, the carriers and battleships were the only ship's with sufficient AA. The Japanese depended on evasive maneuvers of their carriers. That meant the battleships were far away, they could not turn well enough to be near the carriers. As a result, as the land planes and then the TBDs came along in waves, the Japanese formation strung out.
The other point is that the AA on Midway was very good and did down some of the Japanese planes. Those guns have to be considered.
"Our TBD strike was 30 minutes before the dive bombers, plenty of time for the CAP to get back up." That sounds correct, but it also demonstrates that the US failed to execute a coordinated attack with dive bombers and torpedo planes attacking at the same time (which would have prevented at least some of the Japanese CAP from defending against both types of US threats at the same time). And, accepting that the Japanese CAP had enough time to regain patrol altitude after the TBD attacks, how much operating time/unused fuel did they/it have after chasing torpedo planes at low level and then spending fuel to climb to altitude? Maybe the US TBD's had an effect beyond timing.
We were terrible at coordination. We basically fought the battle with two carriers because of that. Part of the role the TBDs played is discussed above. The combined attacks ruined their formations and exhausted ammo.
"The main Japanese fleet was a full day away so counting them as part of Japan's overwhelming force is not right." Does the author discuss whether Kondo's invasion fleet was supposed to be as close to Midway as the four main Japanese carriers? I really would doubt that. As I recall, the Japanese navy still had one major carrier left after the devastating US attacks (Hiryu) while the Kondo invasion fleet was still close enough to invade Midway but instead decided to withdraw. Does the book discuss whether Kondo could still have successfully invaded Midway, covered by Hiryu alone? I.e. does he say whether Kondo withdrew too quickly?
Hiryu was mortally wounded right at dark, she was not able to cover the landing. The Hiryu was sacrificed out of pride. She joined the battleships and charged the US fleet. She could have launched and ran and been available.
Yes, he discussed a landing still being possible. Our carriers were out of planes. But Japan knew her losses were catastrophic.
One point he makes, Midway was useless to Japan. Largely speaking it extended her lines that she could not defend.
He also points out that Japan wargamed Midway and lost their carriers to the American fleet hiding almost where we really did hide. Yamamoto overruled the referee. He said the US would fight in the open in front of Midway, that we would not lie in wait (plus we would not be there to begin with). So the US fleet was placed where he wanted it, and Japan still lost two carriers.