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Maybe they could get Tiger. MJ was immensely private about his personal life as well, but age can make people do some funny things. We'll never know because like I said, they jumped the gun.

A lot thought that "The Last Dance" was just a Jordan fluff piece. A Tiger doc with a Tiger interview would likely be in a similar vein.

But I'd like to watch a documentary about the greatest golfer of all time and his golf career. The salacious details of his personal life I suppose are appealing to women, but they can always pick up a magazine in the check out line at the super market.
Appealing to women? Lmao. Yeah they are going to make a documentary about Tiger without touching his behavior. In what universe? Maybe Tiger will produce his own someday and give you what you want, your fluffy little, isn’t he great film.
 
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Maybe they could get Tiger. MJ was immensely private about his personal life as well, but age can make people do some funny things. We'll never know because like I said, they jumped the gun.

A lot thought that "The Last Dance" was just a Jordan fluff piece. A Tiger doc with a Tiger interview would likely be in a similar vein.

But I'd like to watch a documentary about the greatest golfer of all time and his golf career. The salacious details of his personal life I suppose are appealing to women, but they can always pick up a magazine in the check out line at the super market.
If only John Facenda could narrate it...
 
Appealing to women? Lmao. Yeah they are going to make a documentary about Tiger without touching his behavior. In what universe? Maybe Tiger will produce his own someday and give you what you want, your fluffy little, isn’t he great film.

But that right there is the difference between men and women when it comes to watching sports. We enjoy the sport for the sake of the sport itself. You like the soap opera. Speaking generally of course. Am I wrong here?
 
Eh. No Tiger, no Elin, in fact outside of Stevie Williams, very few people who were ever in his inner circle. All we got were High School girlfriends and bottle service girls from Vegas. Plus the guys career isn't even over yet, it'd be like making a documentary about Tom Brady.

Couldn't shake the feeling that it was just a cash grab trying to capitalize on the success of the "The Last Dance".

Not to mention Bryant Gumbel appearing on screen every 10 minutes to let us all know that we're racists' was a bit exhausting.
I thought it was pretty weak. A casual fan may have gotten something from it, but it was mostly old news. The highlight of the series for me was the reemergence of “Evidently Chickentown”.
 
But that right there is the difference between men and women when it comes to watching sports. We enjoy the sport for the sake of the sport itself. You like the soap opera. Speaking generally of course. Am I wrong here?
I’d be willing to put my sporting knowledge against yours any day of the week. Clarify: football and basketball only.
 
Appealing to women? Lmao. Yeah they are going to make a documentary about Tiger without touching his behavior. In what universe? Maybe Tiger will produce his own someday and give you what you want, your fluffy little, isn’t he great film.

Perhaps the same folks who have done the Kobe stuff could do that for Tiger.
 
Take a look at In & Of Itself by Derek DelGaudio just out on Hulu. Fascinating performance art piece. A friend attended a live performance of this in NYC and thought it was one of the most moving theatre experiences of his life.
 
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The Fall on Amazon Prime. British police procedural set in Northern Ireland. Gillian Anderson is sent from London to investigate a murder, which soon is determined to be one of a series of murders. The culprit is revealed from the beginning; the show is all about the chase and the final disposition. The ending is a bit meh, but satisfactory. Anderson is smoking hot throughout. I'd give it a 7/10.
 
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I got back into Lovecraft Country tonight. I watched the first two episodes last year, then quit, for reasons unrelated to the show. I think it was easy, because the first two episodes felt very self-contained. It was a good place to stop. But I got back into it, and I wasn't blown away, but it stayed strong. Made it through Ep. 6 "Meet Me in Daegu." It was effing incredible. What an episode of television. It had all the hallmarks of mediocre TV. It was a flashback episode. It centered mainly around a character that was effectively new (she'd been heard on a phone a couple of times before). It greatly departed from the general tenor of the show as developed so far. Should have been a disaster. But it really worked. Probably the highlight episode of the series for me so far. Jonathan Majors added multiple layers to his character. An incredible performance.
 
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As someone who considers themself a person of faith, William Lane Craigs reasonable faith podcast is a recent favorite of mine.

Anyone else listen to this? I think it’s pretty good.

 
Just finished Lupin on Netflix. Very entertaining heist limited series. Omar Sy is the lead and he’s great.
 
Agents of Chaos on HBO Max. Eye opening on many levels. Their role in goading people into the racial discourse last year was unreal...
 
IMDB reviews are almost unanimous that it started out great and then went to shit by season three.
I have watched season 1 and 2, and just watched the first episode of season 3, which didn't intrigue me as much, so IMDB seems to be on point.

Also, Pullman's tendency to deliver every line, no matter how innocent, through a tightly-clenched jaw, is getting a little tedious.
 
Babylon Berlin is among the best shows out there. It’s a chore to get into but well worth it. The most ambitious German production ever. Set in roaring 20’s Berlin, lots of foreshadowing about what was coming.
 
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For those that like history, I just finished reading Shattered Sword and recommend it. This is on the Japanese at Midway and challenges several long held beliefs.

Basically, the Japanese were never close to launching a strike on the American fleet. No Japanese strike planes were warming up on deck. The float plane from the cruiser Tone launching late played no role in Japan's defeat. The Aleutian Campaign was not a distraction campaign, in fact the opposite seems likely given there was a debate on postponing Midway due to two carriers being unavailable. But it was argued that without Midway the US would respond to the Aleutian attack which had to go off then because of weather.

He also suggests that Midway was a great win, but it was not against overwhelming odds. The Japanese carriers carried fewer planes, in carrier planes the Japanese had a narrow majority but including Midway we had more planes. The main Japanese fleet was a full day away so counting them as part of Japan's overwhelming force is not right.

He also blames Japan's doctrine. Japan knew she could not match us in production, so her whole philosophy was to strike first with overwhelming force at a distance we could not reach. Since most of their search planes were unarmed combat planes, she starved her searches to keep every combat plane possible available for strike.

She also did not prioritize damage control. A crew leaving a gun mount to fight a fire reduced the ship's firepower. So largely speaking there just were not enough people fighting the fires. Lastly, our torpedo planes did not pull Japan's air cover down. Our TBDs did play a role in the destruction of the fleet, but it was far more complicated than pulling the CAP down. Our TBD strike was 30 minutes before the dive bombers, plenty of time for the CAP to get back up.

Japanese carriers did have more armor around her hangers, which was a rare nod to defense. American hangers were open at the sides, with rolling metal panels to try to provide some defense. But the Japanese system meant that when the bombs exploded in the hanger deck the explosions were contained. This actually caused far more damage to the hanger deck which was filled with aviation fuel and bombs.

The book explains that one of the highest ranking Japanese Midway survivors, air group commander Fuchida, wrote Japan's first book on the battle after Japan lifted her ban on war books in the 50s. He had a vested interest to portray the battle one way. This idea that fate intervened seconds before she would sink the US fleet did well for his agenda. American authors picked up on it as it fit a narrative we liked.
 
For those that like history, I just finished reading Shattered Sword and recommend it. This is on the Japanese at Midway and challenges several long held beliefs.

Basically, the Japanese were never close to launching a strike on the American fleet. No Japanese strike planes were warming up on deck. The float plane from the cruiser Tone launching late played no role in Japan's defeat. The Aleutian Campaign was not a distraction campaign, in fact the opposite seems likely given there was a debate on postponing Midway due to two carriers being unavailable. But it was argued that without Midway the US would respond to the Aleutian attack which had to go off then because of weather.

He also suggests that Midway was a great win, but it was not against overwhelming odds. The Japanese carriers carried fewer planes, in carrier planes the Japanese had a narrow majority but including Midway we had more planes. The main Japanese fleet was a full day away so counting them as part of Japan's overwhelming force is not right.

He also blames Japan's doctrine. Japan knew she could not match us in production, so her whole philosophy was to strike first with overwhelming force at a distance we could not reach. Since most of their search planes were unarmed combat planes, she starved her searches to keep every combat plane possible available for strike.

She also did not prioritize damage control. A crew leaving a gun mount to fight a fire reduced the ship's firepower. So largely speaking there just were not enough people fighting the fires. Lastly, our torpedo planes did not pull Japan's air cover down. Our TBDs did play a role in the destruction of the fleet, but it was far more complicated than pulling the CAP down. Our TBD strike was 30 minutes before the dive bombers, plenty of time for the CAP to get back up.

Japanese carriers did have more armor around her hangers, which was a rare nod to defense. American hangers were open at the sides, with rolling metal panels to try to provide some defense. But the Japanese system meant that when the bombs exploded in the hanger deck the explosions were contained. This actually caused far more damage to the hanger deck which was filled with aviation fuel and bombs.

The book explains that one of the highest ranking Japanese Midway survivors, air group commander Fuchida, wrote Japan's first book on the battle after Japan lifted her ban on war books in the 50s. He had a vested interest to portray the battle one way. This idea that fate intervened seconds before she would sink the US fleet did well for his agenda. American authors picked up on it as it fit a narrative we liked.
I'm going to have to check out this book, but I'm surprised at a couple things.

"No Japanese strike planes were warming up on deck." But weren't they on deck nonetheless, receiving fuel for a second attack on something when the US carrier planes attacked (regardless whether engines were running)? Japanese fuel lines were like big long firecracker fuses. At some point in the war. American carriers under attack found a way to inject CO2 into fuel lines to prevent fire damage, so I can believe the Japanese navy didn't prioritize damage control in the same way.

"including Midway we had more planes." Well, maybe, but how many of the land based aircraft on Midway were comparable to the aircraft on the Japanese navy's carriers for purposes of attacking ships (not land targets), I doubt if Midway's B-17's, PBY's and obsolete fighters were relevant threats to the Japanese navy especially after the initial runway damage. Does the book talk about that? Maybe I'm wrong. (Sheer numbers don't automatically matter so much.)

"Our TBD strike was 30 minutes before the dive bombers, plenty of time for the CAP to get back up." That sounds correct, but it also demonstrates that the US failed to execute a coordinated attack with dive bombers and torpedo planes attacking at the same time (which would have prevented at least some of the Japanese CAP from defending against both types of US threats at the same time). And, accepting that the Japanese CAP had enough time to regain patrol altitude after the TBD attacks, how much operating time/unused fuel did they/it have after chasing torpedo planes at low level and then spending fuel to climb to altitude? Maybe the US TBD's had an effect beyond timing.

"The main Japanese fleet was a full day away so counting them as part of Japan's overwhelming force is not right." Does the author discuss whether Kondo's invasion fleet was supposed to be as close to Midway as the four main Japanese carriers? I really would doubt that. As I recall, the Japanese navy still had one major carrier left after the devastating US attacks (Hiryu) while the Kondo invasion fleet was still close enough to invade Midway but instead decided to withdraw. Does the book discuss whether Kondo could still have successfully invaded Midway, covered by Hiryu alone? I.e. does he say whether Kondo withdrew too quickly?

Sorry, man. Too many questions. Not an attack, I promise. I got interested in the topic, that's all.
 
No Japanese strike planes were warming up on deck." But weren't they on deck nonetheless, receiving fuel for a second attack on something when the US carrier planes attacked (regardless whether engines were running)? Japanese fuel lines were like big long firecracker fuses. At some point in the war. American carriers under attack found a way to inject CO2 into fuel lines to prevent fire damage, so I can believe the Japanese navy didn't prioritize damage control in the same way.
Some American pilots reported planes on the deck, others did not. On the decks were the CAP planes landing and taking off. The Zero had a weak MG, to down our bombers they had to use cannon. Zeroes carried very little cannon ammo, so planes had to land and refill cannons.

The Japanese did not prepare bombers on deck while take-offs landing. It was a matter 9f doctrine and safety, they lacked the crash barriers we had. Because fighters were taking off and landing, the bombers stayed below decks.

It also too a full half hour to warm up engines of the bombers. Since the bombers were below deck, it was at least 30 minutes to take off.

The bombers were fueled below decks, he discussed the CO2 issue.
"including Midway we had more planes." Well, maybe, but how many of the land based aircraft on Midway were comparable to the aircraft on the Japanese navy's carriers for purposes of attacking ships (not land targets), I doubt if Midway's B-17's, PBY's and obsolete fighters were relevant threats to the Japanese navy especially after the initial runway damage. Does the book talk about that? Maybe I'm wrong. (Sheer numbers don't automatically matter so much.)

Yes, most of our land planes were inferior. But a couple points on that. They did keep the Japanese carriers running from their attacks. Japan's fleet was weak in AA fire, the carriers and battleships were the only ship's with sufficient AA. The Japanese depended on evasive maneuvers of their carriers. That meant the battleships were far away, they could not turn well enough to be near the carriers. As a result, as the land planes and then the TBDs came along in waves, the Japanese formation strung out.

The other point is that the AA on Midway was very good and did down some of the Japanese planes. Those guns have to be considered.


"Our TBD strike was 30 minutes before the dive bombers, plenty of time for the CAP to get back up." That sounds correct, but it also demonstrates that the US failed to execute a coordinated attack with dive bombers and torpedo planes attacking at the same time (which would have prevented at least some of the Japanese CAP from defending against both types of US threats at the same time). And, accepting that the Japanese CAP had enough time to regain patrol altitude after the TBD attacks, how much operating time/unused fuel did they/it have after chasing torpedo planes at low level and then spending fuel to climb to altitude? Maybe the US TBD's had an effect beyond timing.

We were terrible at coordination. We basically fought the battle with two carriers because of that. Part of the role the TBDs played is discussed above. The combined attacks ruined their formations and exhausted ammo.


"The main Japanese fleet was a full day away so counting them as part of Japan's overwhelming force is not right." Does the author discuss whether Kondo's invasion fleet was supposed to be as close to Midway as the four main Japanese carriers? I really would doubt that. As I recall, the Japanese navy still had one major carrier left after the devastating US attacks (Hiryu) while the Kondo invasion fleet was still close enough to invade Midway but instead decided to withdraw. Does the book discuss whether Kondo could still have successfully invaded Midway, covered by Hiryu alone? I.e. does he say whether Kondo withdrew too quickly?
Hiryu was mortally wounded right at dark, she was not able to cover the landing. The Hiryu was sacrificed out of pride. She joined the battleships and charged the US fleet. She could have launched and ran and been available.

Yes, he discussed a landing still being possible. Our carriers were out of planes. But Japan knew her losses were catastrophic.

One point he makes, Midway was useless to Japan. Largely speaking it extended her lines that she could not defend.

He also points out that Japan wargamed Midway and lost their carriers to the American fleet hiding almost where we really did hide. Yamamoto overruled the referee. He said the US would fight in the open in front of Midway, that we would not lie in wait (plus we would not be there to begin with). So the US fleet was placed where he wanted it, and Japan still lost two carriers.
 
I'm going to have to check out this book, but I'm surprised at a couple things.

"No Japanese strike planes were warming up on deck." But weren't they on deck nonetheless, receiving fuel for a second attack on something when the US carrier planes attacked (regardless whether engines were running)? Japanese fuel lines were like big long firecracker fuses. At some point in the war. American carriers under attack found a way to inject CO2 into fuel lines to prevent fire damage, so I can believe the Japanese navy didn't prioritize damage control in the same way.

"including Midway we had more planes." Well, maybe, but how many of the land based aircraft on Midway were comparable to the aircraft on the Japanese navy's carriers for purposes of attacking ships (not land targets), I doubt if Midway's B-17's, PBY's and obsolete fighters were relevant threats to the Japanese navy especially after the initial runway damage. Does the book talk about that? Maybe I'm wrong. (Sheer numbers don't automatically matter so much.)

"Our TBD strike was 30 minutes before the dive bombers, plenty of time for the CAP to get back up." That sounds correct, but it also demonstrates that the US failed to execute a coordinated attack with dive bombers and torpedo planes attacking at the same time (which would have prevented at least some of the Japanese CAP from defending against both types of US threats at the same time). And, accepting that the Japanese CAP had enough time to regain patrol altitude after the TBD attacks, how much operating time/unused fuel did they/it have after chasing torpedo planes at low level and then spending fuel to climb to altitude? Maybe the US TBD's had an effect beyond timing.

"The main Japanese fleet was a full day away so counting them as part of Japan's overwhelming force is not right." Does the author discuss whether Kondo's invasion fleet was supposed to be as close to Midway as the four main Japanese carriers? I really would doubt that. As I recall, the Japanese navy still had one major carrier left after the devastating US attacks (Hiryu) while the Kondo invasion fleet was still close enough to invade Midway but instead decided to withdraw. Does the book discuss whether Kondo could still have successfully invaded Midway, covered by Hiryu alone? I.e. does he say whether Kondo withdrew too quickly?

Sorry, man. Too many questions. Not an attack, I promise. I got interested in the topic, that's all.

One more mention, the Zero had a terrible radio and all airplanes used the same frequency. As a result, the ships could not communicate with the planes. In CAP, that meant to vector planes in a direction the ships would open fire in that direction. But that would commit all of CAP in that direction. So if the air controllers noticed they were uncovered, they were forced to launch new fighters. This is what kept happening that morning. They were committing more and more fighters to keep cover, but then those fighters would end up going in the same direction that the attacks were coming from, mostly from Midway. This left holes in other directions.
 
Some American pilots reported planes on the deck, others did not. On the decks were the CAP planes landing and taking off. The Zero had a weak MG, to down our bombers they had to use cannon. Zeroes carried very little cannon ammo, so planes had to land and refill cannons.

The Japanese did not prepare bombers on deck while take-offs landing. It was a matter 9f doctrine and safety, they lacked the crash barriers we had. Because fighters were taking off and landing, the bombers stayed below decks.

It also too a full half hour to warm up engines of the bombers. Since the bombers were below deck, it was at least 30 minutes to take off.

The bombers were fueled below decks, he discussed the CO2 issue.


Yes, most of our land planes were inferior. But a couple points on that. They did keep the Japanese carriers running from their attacks. Japan's fleet was weak in AA fire, the carriers and battleships were the only ship's with sufficient AA. The Japanese depended on evasive maneuvers of their carriers. That meant the battleships were far away, they could not turn well enough to be near the carriers. As a result, as the land planes and then the TBDs came along in waves, the Japanese formation strung out.

The other point is that the AA on Midway was very good and did down some of the Japanese planes. Those guns have to be considered.




We were terrible at coordination. We basically fought the battle with two carriers because of that. Part of the role the TBDs played is discussed above. The combined attacks ruined their formations and exhausted ammo.



Hiryu was mortally wounded right at dark, she was not able to cover the landing. The Hiryu was sacrificed out of pride. She joined the battleships and charged the US fleet. She could have launched and ran and been available.

Yes, he discussed a landing still being possible. Our carriers were out of planes. But Japan knew her losses were catastrophic.

One point he makes, Midway was useless to Japan. Largely speaking it extended her lines that she could not defend.

He also points out that Japan wargamed Midway and lost their carriers to the American fleet hiding almost where we really did hide. Yamamoto overruled the referee. He said the US would fight in the open in front of Midway, that we would not lie in wait (plus we would not be there to begin with). So the US fleet was placed where he wanted it, and Japan still lost two carriers.
To really get into the weeds, from what I've heard about the US commanders, I wonder if the Japanese correctly assessed that bull-in-the-china-shop Halsey would "fight in the open in front of Midway" but (due to Halsey's unexpected rash and hospitalization) what the Japanese got instead was a sneakier and trickier Spruance.

Midway still seems like an unexpected US victory.
 
To really get into the weeds, from what I've heard about the US commanders, I wonder if the Japanese correctly assessed that bull-in-the-china-shop Halsey would "fight in the open in front of Midway" but (due to Halsey's unexpected rash and hospitalization) what the Japanese got instead was a sneakier and trickier Spruance.

Midway still seems like an unexpected US victory.
It was unexpected, just not the massive shock. It may be Halsey played a role. I am reading a book on 44-45, the author points out that the Japanese liked when Halsey was in command of the fleet because Spruance did not fall for bait.

That book is Fleet at Flood Tide.
 
It was unexpected, just not the massive shock. It may be Halsey played a role. I am reading a book on 44-45, the author points out that the Japanese liked when Halsey was in command of the fleet because Spruance did not fall for bait.

That book is Fleet at Flood Tide.
The Japanese had Halsey figured. It was a stroke of bad luck for them that he had to miss Midway. As it was, he nearly cost the Americans dearly at Leyte Gulf by chasing empty carriers and leaving the invasion force vulnerable. It took some major heroics and the fact that the Japanese were already nearly spent to avoid disaster there.

I just started the first of Ian W Tolls trilogy on the pacific war, Pacific Crucible-War at sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942.

It’s very very good so far. Lots of info I wasn’t aware of. So far, It’s covered Midway, the Japanese naval situation leading up to midway, and a lot on the backstories of Yamamoto and Nimitz.
 
The Japanese had Halsey figured. It was a stroke of bad luck for them that he had to miss Midway. As it was, he nearly cost the Americans dearly at Leyte Gulf by chasing empty carriers and leaving the invasion force vulnerable. It took some major heroics and the fact that the Japanese were already nearly spent to avoid disaster there.

I just started the first of Ian W Tolls trilogy on the pacific war, Pacific Crucible-War at sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942.

It’s very very good so far. Lots of info I wasn’t aware of. So far, It’s covered Midway, the Japanese naval situation leading up to midway, and a lot on the backstories of Yamamoto and Nimitz.

Toll's series is great. Combine Toll's series with Atkinson's Liberation Trilogy on Europe and America in WW2 is completely covered.
 
The Japanese had Halsey figured. It was a stroke of bad luck for them that he had to miss Midway. As it was, he nearly cost the Americans dearly at Leyte Gulf by chasing empty carriers and leaving the invasion force vulnerable. It took some major heroics and the fact that the Japanese were already nearly spent to avoid disaster there.

I just started the first of Ian W Tolls trilogy on the pacific war, Pacific Crucible-War at sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942.

It’s very very good so far. Lots of info I wasn’t aware of. So far, It’s covered Midway, the Japanese naval situation leading up to midway, and a lot on the backstories of Yamamoto and Nimitz.
 
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Babylon Berlin is among the best shows out there. It’s a chore to get into but well worth it. The most ambitious German production ever. Set in roaring 20’s Berlin, lots of foreshadowing about what was coming.
I have mentioned this show to a lot of people and it few seem to want to watch it though. It to me was a much better version of what they were trying to describe in the musical Cabaret about what Germany was like at the end of the 1920's. Berlin at that time was probably the most exciting city on earth but then came the Nazi's and it all ended.
 
I know there are Bosch fans here. Bosch will end with this next season but then be spun off into a new series where Bosch leaves LAPD and goes to work on his own with the lawyer Honey Chandler. It will be shown on IMDB's streaming, which also means Amazon Prime as well.
 
I don't get it, I love the show but I really shouldn't. The premise is stupid and I don't like soccer. But the show is outstanding. I really think it is the positivity in it that makes it so unique from everything else today.
I'm with you (although I do like soccer). When I first saw the promos I thought it sounded really stupid, sort of like a King Ralph for soccer. I thought it would be full of inane jokes about touch lines and the pitch. Heck, the only reason I watched it at all was because we got a free year of Apple+ when we bought our daughter a new laptop for Christmas (and I almost missed that but happened to see an email telling me the offer was about to expire).

But I was hooked after the first episode, and it just got better and better. Why is it so great? Yes, the positivity is very unique these days, but it's also positivity that's not strained to the point of sappiness. And the writing and casting is as good as it gets. The other thing that's unusual is that the storyline (at least for the first season )easily would have worked as a movie. You can't really say that about most TV series.
 
We've got Behind Her Eyes queued up after I heard this rave review on NPR the other day:



Anyone else seen it? Are we going to like it?
 
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