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Visas
The 19 hijackers applied for 23 visas and obtained 22. Five other conspirators were denied U.S. visas. Two more obtained visas but did not participate in the attack for various reasons.
They began attempting to acquire U.S. visas in April 1999, two years and five months before the attack. Consular officers were unaware of the potential significance of an indicator of potential extremism present in some al Qaeda passports, had no information about fraudulent travel stamps that are associated with al Qaeda, and were not trained in terrorist travel tactics generally.
Two Yemenis were denied visas in Yemen for reasons of U.S. immigration law unrelated to terrorism. At the same time, two Saudi hijackers obtained visas in Saudi Arabia. When these two Saudis later showed up in Afghanistan, they were selected for the mission in part because they already had U.S. visas. Later, most of the operatives selected were Saudis, who had little difficulty obtaining visas.
In early 2000, four conspirators sought U.S. visas to learn how to become pilots in the plot. An Egyptian and a Lebanese obtained visas easily in Berlin, because they had established ties to Germany and so did not look like intending immigrants. Both presented new passports. A Yemeni who wanted to be a pilot was repeatedly turned down for a visa because he did not have strong ties to Germany, failed to complete the necessary paperwork, and looked like an intending immigrant.
Thirteen of the hijackers presented passports less than three weeks old when they applied for their visas, but the new passports caused no heightened scrutiny of their visa applications.
Two hijackers lied on their visa applications in detectable ways, but were not further questioned about those lies.
Two hijackers were interviewed for reasons unrelated to terrorism. Most simply had their applications approved and their passports stamped with a U.S. visa. Consular officers were not trained to detect terrorists in a visa interview. Terrorism concerns were handled through the watchlist, and all the conspirators’ names were checked against the terrorist watchlist without producing a match.
One Saudi, one Moroccan, and one Pakistani were each denied visas for reasons unrelated to terrorism. The last conspirator, the Pakistani, was denied on August 27, 2001, in the United Arab Emirates.
The mastermind of the operation, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, used a travel facilitator to acquire a visa on July 23, 2001, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, using an alias."
www.nbcnews.com
