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Russia-Ukraine war has begun

Here's a follow up to that with more detail:




Plus, this great video of a Russian Rocket Launcher explosion

Yes ISW reports widening armored losses too …

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023

The British won the field at Breed’s hill … after the Mass Militia ran out of bullets.

The British took a dim view of frontal assaults on defended positions as a result.
 
Here's a follow up to that with more detail:




Plus, this great video of a Russian Rocket Launcher explosion

Yea that TOS-1A cooking off was VERY impressive, even after the 17th time I watched.

Then for desert, there was a BMP pushing another BMP,presumed to force him to move to the fight, and then a mine (could have been arty) took both of them out. 2'fer ! Slava Ukraine.

 
This is older, but it appears over the summer there were 100 Russian AWOL convictions a week. If there were that many convictions, how many were happening?

I had not seen this, but I have been seeing several videos of Rooskies expressing devastation and that "the loses are not worth the no gains that we made".
 
I had not seen this, but I have been seeing several videos of Rooskies expressing devastation and that "the loses are not worth the no gains that we made".
There are some videos of Russians fragging their officers too. It seems there army is reached what I'll call "advanced Vietnam syndrome" pretty quickly.

They still have good defenses and mud will appear any day. Mud won't help morale, but it will lower losses.

On the other hand, we secretly sent Ukraine ATACMS and they wiped out a couple airfields and a supply depot. Russian helos are going to have to move farther back.
 
There are some videos of Russians fragging their officers too. It seems there army is reached what I'll call "advanced Vietnam syndrome" pretty quickly.

They still have good defenses and mud will appear any day. Mud won't help morale, but it will lower losses.

On the other hand, we secretly sent Ukraine ATACMS and they wiped out a couple airfields and a supply depot. Russian helos are going to have to move farther back.
No shit? I've not saw those, link?
I Since Ukraine has adopted much of the US/ Nato Doctrine of small unit force advancements, vrs the Soviet throw more meat at it, I am not sure the mud is going to stop things. Ukrain hasn't been using huge mech in there nominal advancements.
Last winte the roosian supplies were terrible, I'm expecting many roosian freeze to death starving this year.
I think this "mud season" in Ukrains D day.
They got what, 60-80 (reported) ATACMS and they used 6 (reported)? Roosia's air is fooked. supplies are fooked. This Dnipro beach head is growing and very interesting. Roosia has tremendous forces committed and dieing up north in Andrivkaa, leaving a reasonably "easy" road to the south west, Crimea, cut off Tokmak rail suport... Shit bout to get real if they keep pushing.
 
Of course, it was secret :) . This isn't the link I saw originally but has it.

No, I've seen that ATACMS stuff (awesome ordinance BTW, I want to see 1-4 with the unitary warhead on the Kirsch bridge ) . I meant the Russians fragging their commanders.
 
No, I've seen that ATACMS stuff (awesome ordinance BTW, I want to see 1-4 with the unitary warhead on the Kirsch bridge ) . I meant the Russians fragging their commanders.
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Spot on. Er'body has a breaking point. eventually. Go home Roosia, your countries leader has put you in a corner and now you are not only not the USSR any more, but Russia is about to become 33 different even smaller countries, with no power. Nukes dismantled and you won't even be able to get potatoes for the next 45 years.
Just say thanks Putin. He is the one you ended up destroying you.
 
10,000 Shells a day x 365 days is 3 650 000 or about the 4 million on hand.

Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on October 20 that Russia still has around four million artillery shells remaining, which Russian forces can use for "low intensity" warfare for an additional year.[1] Kiviselg noted that there are reports that North Korea has shipped up to 1,000 containers of ammunition to Russia, each containing between 300-500 pieces of artillery ammunition.[2] Kiviselg estimated that North Korea may have therefore provided between 300,000-500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which can last up to one month at the current daily rate of consumption of around 10,000 shells a day.[3] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk reported on October 23 that Russian forces are currently firing between 10,000-15,000 shells a day, significantly lower than rates of fire in summer 2022 of 45,000-80,000 shells per day.[4] However, Western sources and satellite imagery have confirmed that North Korean deliveries, likely mostly comprised of artillery shells, have drastically increased since Russian and North Korean authorities likely began more official military-technical cooperation in September, as ISW previously reported, and North Korea is likely to provide further deliveries.[5] Based on Western estimates of Russian artillery production capacity and continued North Korean artillery exports, Russia will likely be able to maintain generally sufficient rates of fire in the foreseeable future. While an overall decrease in Russian fire rates could impede the ability of Russian forces to conduct large scale offensive operations, Russian forces are unlikely to face widespread shortages which would chronically undermine defensive operations, and the drop in the rate of fire will not inherently provide Ukrainian forces an advantage. The degree to which Ukraine’s international partners sustain Ukraine’s ability to sustain an effective weight of fire relative to Russian forces will be a key determiner of respective capabilities in 2024.


2,000,000 a year won’t cut it.

2,000,000 a year in the US won’t cut it either …

Industrial capacity matters.
 
10,000 Shells a day x 365 days is 3 650 000 or about the 4 million on hand.

Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on October 20 that Russia still has around four million artillery shells remaining, which Russian forces can use for "low intensity" warfare for an additional year.[1] Kiviselg noted that there are reports that North Korea has shipped up to 1,000 containers of ammunition to Russia, each containing between 300-500 pieces of artillery ammunition.[2] Kiviselg estimated that North Korea may have therefore provided between 300,000-500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which can last up to one month at the current daily rate of consumption of around 10,000 shells a day.[3] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk reported on October 23 that Russian forces are currently firing between 10,000-15,000 shells a day, significantly lower than rates of fire in summer 2022 of 45,000-80,000 shells per day.[4] However, Western sources and satellite imagery have confirmed that North Korean deliveries, likely mostly comprised of artillery shells, have drastically increased since Russian and North Korean authorities likely began more official military-technical cooperation in September, as ISW previously reported, and North Korea is likely to provide further deliveries.[5] Based on Western estimates of Russian artillery production capacity and continued North Korean artillery exports, Russia will likely be able to maintain generally sufficient rates of fire in the foreseeable future. While an overall decrease in Russian fire rates could impede the ability of Russian forces to conduct large scale offensive operations, Russian forces are unlikely to face widespread shortages which would chronically undermine defensive operations, and the drop in the rate of fire will not inherently provide Ukrainian forces an advantage. The degree to which Ukraine’s international partners sustain Ukraine’s ability to sustain an effective weight of fire relative to Russian forces will be a key determiner of respective capabilities in 2024.


2,000,000 a year won’t cut it.

2,000,000 a year in the US won’t cut it either …

Industrial capacity matters.
I wonder about the guns that can shoot those munitions - what's the inventory of those?

I don't expect you to know, but I would imagine that's at least as important as how many shells are produced.
 
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10,000 Shells a day x 365 days is 3 650 000 or about the 4 million on hand.

Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on October 20 that Russia still has around four million artillery shells remaining, which Russian forces can use for "low intensity" warfare for an additional year.[1] Kiviselg noted that there are reports that North Korea has shipped up to 1,000 containers of ammunition to Russia, each containing between 300-500 pieces of artillery ammunition.[2] Kiviselg estimated that North Korea may have therefore provided between 300,000-500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which can last up to one month at the current daily rate of consumption of around 10,000 shells a day.[3] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk reported on October 23 that Russian forces are currently firing between 10,000-15,000 shells a day, significantly lower than rates of fire in summer 2022 of 45,000-80,000 shells per day.[4] However, Western sources and satellite imagery have confirmed that North Korean deliveries, likely mostly comprised of artillery shells, have drastically increased since Russian and North Korean authorities likely began more official military-technical cooperation in September, as ISW previously reported, and North Korea is likely to provide further deliveries.[5] Based on Western estimates of Russian artillery production capacity and continued North Korean artillery exports, Russia will likely be able to maintain generally sufficient rates of fire in the foreseeable future. While an overall decrease in Russian fire rates could impede the ability of Russian forces to conduct large scale offensive operations, Russian forces are unlikely to face widespread shortages which would chronically undermine defensive operations, and the drop in the rate of fire will not inherently provide Ukrainian forces an advantage. The degree to which Ukraine’s international partners sustain Ukraine’s ability to sustain an effective weight of fire relative to Russian forces will be a key determiner of respective capabilities in 2024.


2,000,000 a year won’t cut it.

2,000,000 a year in the US won’t cut it either …

Industrial capacity matters.

I wonder what the inventory of barrels is. I suspect North Korea has them in bulk. But it appears not many of our allies are capable of producing 155 replacements.

 
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I guess one of the benefits of being part of a bureaucracy like NATO is that you can't just fly off the handle in response to perceived threats.

Why do you consider this a perceived threat and not a direct attack and impact on countries' economies and ability to provide utility?
 
I went to law school. Squishy language comes naturally to me.

I have no idea what should or shouldn't happen as a result, but attacking infrastructure that impacts multiple countries seems like an act of war (yes, I realize it probably doesn't meet that exact definition, but I'm at a loss to come up with a good synonym).
 
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I have no idea what should or shouldn't happen as a result, but attacking infrastructure that impacts multiple countries seems like an act of war (yes, I realize it probably doesn't meet that exact definition, but I'm at a loss to come up with a good synonym).
"Act of war" is itself a squishy term that really just means "provocation that we think is bad enough to justify a military response." Does this qualify? I'm not sure it does, but it's certainly in the same ballpark. Sort of like how Pearl Harbor was clearly an act of war, but the Panay maybe wasn't, but was certainly in the aforementioned ballpark.

I'm sure NATO would rather pay for the repairs than escalate based on this single instance of sabotage, though.
 
"Act of war" is itself a squishy term that really just means "provocation that we think is bad enough to justify a military response." Does this qualify? I'm not sure it does, but it's certainly in the same ballpark. Sort of like how Pearl Harbor was clearly an act of war, but the Panay maybe wasn't, but was certainly in the aforementioned ballpark.

I'm sure NATO would rather pay for the repairs than escalate based on this single instance of sabotage, though.

That type of appeasement attitude only welcomes repeat events in the future though, no? If NATO isn't going to respond (and I'm not at the point yet of suggesting there should be a military response), wouldn't that just enable Russia and China to do whatever they want? There's no deterrent, much like Germany in the 1930s, etc.

Also, side bar, but how easy is it to get in and out of Fort Wayne Airport? Trying to figure out how close I can cut a flight.
 
That type of appeasement attitude only welcomes repeat events in the future though, no? If NATO isn't going to respond (and I'm not at the point yet of suggesting there should be a military response), wouldn't that just enable Russia and China to do whatever they want? There's no deterrent, much like Germany in the 1930s, etc.

Also, side bar, but how easy is it to get in and out of Fort Wayne Airport? Trying to figure out how close I can cut a flight.
I guess we just have to decide when it is and isn't worth it?

As for FWA, I don't really fly, but my few experiences there were pretty stress-free. And the roads getting into and out of the airport are much bigger than an airport of that size deserves.
 
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10,000 Shells a day x 365 days is 3 650 000 or about the 4 million on hand.

Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on October 20 that Russia still has around four million artillery shells remaining, which Russian forces can use for "low intensity" warfare for an additional year.[1] Kiviselg noted that there are reports that North Korea has shipped up to 1,000 containers of ammunition to Russia, each containing between 300-500 pieces of artillery ammunition.[2] Kiviselg estimated that North Korea may have therefore provided between 300,000-500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which can last up to one month at the current daily rate of consumption of around 10,000 shells a day.[3] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk reported on October 23 that Russian forces are currently firing between 10,000-15,000 shells a day, significantly lower than rates of fire in summer 2022 of 45,000-80,000 shells per day.[4] However, Western sources and satellite imagery have confirmed that North Korean deliveries, likely mostly comprised of artillery shells, have drastically increased since Russian and North Korean authorities likely began more official military-technical cooperation in September, as ISW previously reported, and North Korea is likely to provide further deliveries.[5] Based on Western estimates of Russian artillery production capacity and continued North Korean artillery exports, Russia will likely be able to maintain generally sufficient rates of fire in the foreseeable future. While an overall decrease in Russian fire rates could impede the ability of Russian forces to conduct large scale offensive operations, Russian forces are unlikely to face widespread shortages which would chronically undermine defensive operations, and the drop in the rate of fire will not inherently provide Ukrainian forces an advantage. The degree to which Ukraine’s international partners sustain Ukraine’s ability to sustain an effective weight of fire relative to Russian forces will be a key determiner of respective capabilities in 2024.


2,000,000 a year won’t cut it.

2,000,000 a year in the US won’t cut it either …

Industrial capacity matters.
2 000 000 rounds requires about 18 000 000 LBs of high strength steel (9 000 short tons).

No steel domestic steel production … no cases for the Composition B …
(Blast furnaces produce in excess of 1 ton of pig iron a day)

https://web.archive.org/web/20201125223353/https://www.gd-ots.com/munitions/artillery/155m-m107/
 
The area in blue keeps getting bigger on this map.
Russian’s appear to be holding the line in Verbove.

Pyatykhatky%20and%20Robotyne%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20October%2024%2C2023.png
 
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Has anyone seen any credible report about Putin having a heart attack?
 
Has anyone seen any credible report about Putin having a heart attack?
Some sites, no idea which can be considered credible these days, are claiming he’s dead. Appearances at big state events getting cancelled, etc…
 
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