Here is a piece explaining why calls for us to blame Islam for violent Islamist terrorism play right into the hands of ISIS and al Qaeda:
Since no later than September 11, 2001, it has been clear that we face a serious terrorist threat from violent Islamist extremists. But those who claim to be the most serious about combatting this threat remain the least serious about understanding it. As a result, our policy discussions tend to locate only along the strong-weak axis, without consideration of the smart-stupid axis.
To understand what's going on, we must first confront our own ignorance, and start asking serious questions with minds open to answers that don't flatter our preconceptions. Or at least that's what we'd do if we really were serious about combatting the threat.
(By the way, the piece is studded with links that aptly illustrate the author's points. It's worth at least glancing at them to know what specific examples the author intends.)
For al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State, propaganda is their most important tool for shaping perceptions, polarizing support and mobilizing a small but potent fringe of Western supporters. However, strategic communication to offset this propaganda is broadly recognized as a major counterterrorism weakness. My research suggests that calls for secular Western governments to focus on countering extremist ideology with their own ideology-centric counternarratives are ill-advised, because such strategies are likely ineffective if not counterproductive.
A disproportionate focus on ideology when trying to understand propaganda’s appeal will likely result in misguided counter-strategies. Instead, it is valuable to explore how extremist messaging is designed to leverage psychosocial forces and strategic factors pertinent to their audiences. I analyzed the contents of AQAP’s Inspire and the Islamic State’s Dabiq English-language magazines to understand how each seeks to appeal to and radicalize its readers. Published in the Australian Journal of Political Science and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, this research provides insight into not just the strategic logic of AQAP and Islamic State’s propaganda strategies targeting the West but also what drives people to support them.
. . . To exacerbate perceptions of crisis among their Western readership, these magazines often highlight the singling out of Muslim populations in the West — whether as the disproportionate targets of national security efforts or the focus of populist anti-Islam rhetoric, as in this excerpt from Inspire:
Better-intentioned politicians and counterterrorism authorities may also be inadvertently and more subtly undermining efforts to counter extremism. Many Muslims living in the West have expressed their exasperation with the constant pressure to describe themselves as “moderates.” This view is frequently echoed during my travels in the Middle East and South Asia. As one Syrian activist said to me: “Why do you insist on us saying that we are ‘moderates?’ I am a Muslim, this is Islam. That’s it. Or do you want us to lose credibility in our audience’s eyes? When you insist I say ‘moderate,’ that’s for you. To my audience, that means not Islam.” Using “moderate” Muslims as the champions of government schemes or demanding that Muslims identify themselves as “moderates” risks inadvertently delegitimizing those voices in their communities, especially among those most vulnerable to propaganda’s siren call. [Rockfish: Note that this exactly what those who are most convinced they understand the terror threat call for us to do.]
A disproportionate focus on ideology when trying to understand propaganda’s appeal will likely result in misguided counter-strategies. Instead, it is valuable to explore how extremist messaging is designed to leverage psychosocial forces and strategic factors pertinent to their audiences. I analyzed the contents of AQAP’s Inspire and the Islamic State’s Dabiq English-language magazines to understand how each seeks to appeal to and radicalize its readers. Published in the Australian Journal of Political Science and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, this research provides insight into not just the strategic logic of AQAP and Islamic State’s propaganda strategies targeting the West but also what drives people to support them.
. . . To exacerbate perceptions of crisis among their Western readership, these magazines often highlight the singling out of Muslim populations in the West — whether as the disproportionate targets of national security efforts or the focus of populist anti-Islam rhetoric, as in this excerpt from Inspire:
… your belongingness to Islam is enough to classify you as an enemy. As a matter of fact, they look at us as Muslim youth regardless of our appearance and education. They do not consider our citizenship and the childhood we spent in their neighborhoods. … Our enemies treat us as Muslims only, nothing more. … One treatment, one blame.
Populist politicians in the United States, Europe and Australia who seek political advantage with Islamophobic dog-whistle politics are actually doing more to boost the appeal of extremism than counter it. Such rhetoric helps to intensify perceptions of crisis across Muslim communities and fuel the psychosocial conditions within which extremist propaganda tends to resonate. It also crudely validates the “competitive systems of meaning” advanced by groups like Islamic State and AQAP. Furthermore, when that rhetoric manipulates fears among disenfranchised sections of the broader community and ties their sense of crisis to certain races and religions (out-groups) and solutions to a utopian nationalist identity (in-group), it empowers far-right extremists and helps to broaden their appeal. [Rockfish: Note how our extremists and theirs feed off each other.]
Better-intentioned politicians and counterterrorism authorities may also be inadvertently and more subtly undermining efforts to counter extremism. Many Muslims living in the West have expressed their exasperation with the constant pressure to describe themselves as “moderates.” This view is frequently echoed during my travels in the Middle East and South Asia. As one Syrian activist said to me: “Why do you insist on us saying that we are ‘moderates?’ I am a Muslim, this is Islam. That’s it. Or do you want us to lose credibility in our audience’s eyes? When you insist I say ‘moderate,’ that’s for you. To my audience, that means not Islam.” Using “moderate” Muslims as the champions of government schemes or demanding that Muslims identify themselves as “moderates” risks inadvertently delegitimizing those voices in their communities, especially among those most vulnerable to propaganda’s siren call. [Rockfish: Note that this exactly what those who are most convinced they understand the terror threat call for us to do.]
Since no later than September 11, 2001, it has been clear that we face a serious terrorist threat from violent Islamist extremists. But those who claim to be the most serious about combatting this threat remain the least serious about understanding it. As a result, our policy discussions tend to locate only along the strong-weak axis, without consideration of the smart-stupid axis.
To understand what's going on, we must first confront our own ignorance, and start asking serious questions with minds open to answers that don't flatter our preconceptions. Or at least that's what we'd do if we really were serious about combatting the threat.
(By the way, the piece is studded with links that aptly illustrate the author's points. It's worth at least glancing at them to know what specific examples the author intends.)
