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Atlantic just released all the texts this a.m. and it is not good

I don't get the "it's not good" part. Isn't this kind of what we would have expected the exchanges to be?

It's what I expected, anyway.
Hold on. Every person in Congress and the National Security positions in the government knows that this is not good. The dishonest ones will say, "it's no big deal." When you hear this from anyone, know they're lying. Or an ignorant person passing on a liar's spin.
 
Super stupid speculation. No surprise you're doing it.
It's definitely speculation on his part. But, until we know more about what happened, I wouldn't totally discount that as a possibility.

Waltz claims (anyway) that he doesn't have Jeffrey Goldberg in his list of contacts. So hopefully they'll figure out how he got added.

Still....I'm going to continue beating this drum: it's indefensible that they were using a public platform to have this conversation in the first place. However Goldberg got looped in, it was made possible by the decision to use Signal in the first place. And if they don't have any genuinely isolated platform to do this on, they need to develop one.
 
Hold on. Every person in Congress and the National Security positions in the government knows that this is not good. The dishonest ones will say, "it's no big deal." When you hear this from anyone, know they're lying. Or an ignorant person passing on a liar's spin.
I'm simply saying that content itself, Aloha. Not the fact that it leaked -- of course that's not good.

Is there something in the transcript that should upset me? That's what I thought @Mark Milton was saying...that the comments themselves were "not good."
 
The general who testified yesterday said that he would have expected that such information such as the above would be classified.

The participants in the hearing yesterday said there was no classified information. Hegs told us 2 days ago that that it was another made up story.

It is not good good because it happened and shouldn't have happened in the format in which it was and who was on the chat. It is not good because at least 4 people lied about it. Whether anyone had an expectation of it existing shouldn't alter the conclusion
Gabbard said there was no classified intelligence information. She deferred to the others about defense info.
 
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The general who testified yesterday said that he would have expected that such information such as the above would be classified.

The participants in the hearing yesterday said there was no classified information. Hegs told us 2 days ago that that it was another made up story.

It is not good good because it happened and shouldn't have happened in the format in which it was and who was on the chat. It is not good because at least 4 people lied about it. Whether anyone had an expectation of it existing shouldn't alter the conclusion
OK.

I thought you were saying that the transcript itself was what was "not good." I read through the whole thing -- and it's pretty much what I expected to see.

Obviously, I haven't defended the leak itself. It's indefensible that these kinds of comms are happening on a public platform.
 
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The general who testified yesterday said that he would have expected that such information such as the above would be classified.

The participants in the hearing yesterday said there was no classified information. Hegs told us 2 days ago that that it was another made up story.

It is not good good because it happened and shouldn't have happened in the format in which it was and who was on the chat. It is not good because at least 4 people lied about it. Whether anyone had an expectation of it existing shouldn't alter the conclusion
Mission strike plans and details are ALWAYS classified, unless it's dummy information in a war college course. This is real world classified mission strike plan details. Compromise of that to the Houthis could have made them prepared for the strike and possibly shoot down a jet and move the high value human target. This was classified and Hegseth was undoubtedly reading it on SIPR (CENTCOM wouldn't be sending it any other way) and retyping it into Signal. That's the actions of an amateur or someone cavalier about protecting classified information. He was a Major. That's a junior officer, but EVERY officer knows about protecting classified information. At least I thought they all did.
 
It’s not news that smart phones are unsecure devices. That is why the app was encrypted.

Hold in.

So your saying, after a memo went out to be careful using Signal because Russia could be monitoring it, that it was okay to use said app with attack plans on a known Russian ally because the app is encrypted?

It's no wonder why we're in the situation we're in.
 
It’s not news that smart phones are unsecure devices. That is why the app was encrypted.

I'd like to know why CISA was recommending it. And why (at least in the case of Ratcliffe at the CIA) the agency was installing it. If Ratcliffe is right, the use of Signal wasn't some rogue decision on their part.
 
It’s not news that smart phones are unsecure devices. That is why the app was encrypted.
Nope. We have secure smart phones these days. Signal has a level of encryption that provides some protection to private information, but it's not going to stop any sophisticated hacker (Russia, China, India, US, etc.) from accessing the data passed via Signal. Other apps for private use has some encryption too. However, Signal is not authorized for sensitive and classified information - the DoD reiterated this fact to all DoD personnel just a few days ago. This is the bottom line you need to focus on here.
 
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Gabbard said there was no classified intelligence information. She deferred to the others about defense info.
that's not what she said. Her exact words were: "there was no classified material that was shared” in the group chat. Cotton did his best to clean up her mess, which was pathetic. His exact question was: "“They testified, is my understanding — correct me if I’m wrong — that there’s no intelligence community classified information: Is that correct?”.

Ratcliffe said “I haven’t participated in any Signal group messaging that relates to any classified information at all”
 
Hold in.

So your saying, after a memo went out to be careful using Signal because Russia could be monitoring it, that it was okay to use said app with attack plans on a known Russian ally because the app is encrypted?

It's no wonder why we're in the situation we're in.
Okay, now I'm getting concerned. If this was a regular run of the mill fvck up, dbm, Ty, and DANC would be the only ones posting bullshit distractions. Now, they've pulled out the big guns (COHVACS). This very well could be a DEFCON 5 level event. I need to find an old school desk to get under and hide.
 
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I'd like to know why CISA was recommending it. And why (at least in the case of Ratcliffe at the CIA) the agency was installing it. If Ratcliffe is right, the use of Signal wasn't some rogue decision on their part.
The DOD came out with a warning a week before this chat and said, in essence, Signal can be compromised easily
 
I'd like to know why CISA was recommending it. And why (at least in the case of Ratcliffe at the CIA) the agency was installing it. If Ratcliffe is right, the use of Signal wasn't some rogue decision on their part.

Seems pretty clear that the Pentagon policy is that Signal is not an approved application within DOD
 
They're ignorant or for some strange reason thought it was OK to discuss mission strike details on Signal. Hegseth introduced the information that absolutely isn't authorized on Signal and then Waltz introduced near real time intelligence. For all we know there was collective gasp when Hegseth started posting mission strike details and they thought, "I sure hope no one ever knows we ****ed up big time here."

I don't think there's a big mystery about Goldberg. The National Security Advisor probably has the number of every major journalist that covers national security stories in his contacts. Regardless of how he got there, it doesn't change the fact that what was discussed shouldn't have been discussed on Signal. Goldberg did the right thing with the information - protected it until after the strike was over which confirmed it.
The national security advisor denies knowing Goldberg or knowing his cell number. if Goldberg’s number was indeed on his phone, others put it there. I think that is a reach.

You are right. Goldberg did the right thing pre-strike.

Why would the encrypted app be on government phones if it wasn’t to share info thought to have some level of security.
 
Nope. We have secure smart phones these days. Signal has a level of encryption that provides some protection to private information, but it's not going to stop any sophisticated hacker (Russia, China, India, US, etc.) from accessing the data passed via Signal. Other apps for private use has some encryption too. However, Signal is not authorized for sensitive and classified information - the DoD reiterated this fact to all DoD personnel just a few days ago. This is the bottom line you need to focus on here.

Wonder why they were reiterating that a few days ago? ;)
 
Okay, now I'm getting concerned. If this was a regular run of the mill fvck up, dbm, Ty, and DANC would be the only ones posting bullshit distractions. Now, they've pulled out the big guns (COHVACS). This very well could be a DEFCON 5 level event. I need to find an old school desk to get under and hide.
Nah @DANC doesn't like this stuff either. He's reasonable. Especially when you send him nudes
 
It's definitely speculation on his part. But, until we know more about what happened, I wouldn't totally discount that as a possibility.

Waltz claims (anyway) that he doesn't have Jeffrey Goldberg in his list of contacts. So hopefully they'll figure out how he got added.

Still....I'm going to continue beating this drum: it's indefensible that they were using a public platform to have this conversation in the first place. However Goldberg got looped in, it was made possible by the decision to use Signal in the first place. And if they don't have any genuinely isolated platform to do this on, they need to develop one.
They have apps on SIPR that allow these sorts of conversations. I had two computers on my desk on the ship. One was for Unclassified business and the other was a SIPR computer for classified business. Back in the day, a Radioman would bring the classified hard copy messages to me to read, I'd initial that I read it, and the Radioman would take it to the next person that should see that message and sign off on it. At the end of the routing, the Radioman took it back to radio and he and another Radioman would destroy it and document it's destruction. Now, all those authorized for SIPR access classified messages and other classified information sitting at their desk. Of course, they also have to be in a space authorized for SIPR computers and SIPR internet (SIPRNET). That would be CO, XO, Combat and the Comm Center on a ship. Hegseth's office would be an authorized space. Even so, the very highest level of classified information (Top Secret/SAP or SCI) can only be accessed in a highly secure SCIF and not elsewhere.
 
The DOD came out with a warning a week before this chat and said, in essence, Signal can be compromised easily
Yeah, this is what I've been saying: they shouldn't have been on Signal (or any other public network).

So why the hell was CISA pushing it? Because they were. Why was the CIA installing it? Because, according to Ratcliffe, they did.

I think where we may differ here is in how this platform came to be chosen. But we don't really know that yet. You seem to think that Hegseth & Co. made this call independently of anything or anybody else. In fact, worse, they made that decision in defiance of policy.

Maybe they did. But, if so, why the CISA guidance? Why is CIA IT coming in and saying "Here you go Mike...this is called Signal."

We need to know how and why this platform was used. And we don't know that yet.
 
I'm simply saying that content itself, Aloha. Not the fact that it leaked -- of course that's not good.

Is there something in the transcript that should upset me? That's what I thought @Mark Milton was saying...that the comments themselves were "not good."
Using that platform for mission strike plan details is not good. If it was compromised and provided to the Houthis (possibly by the Russians) it could have resulted in mission failure and even the loss of aircraft and pilots.
 
Yeah, this is what I've been saying: they shouldn't have been on Signal (or any other public network).

So why the hell was CISA pushing it? Because they were. Why was the CIA installing it? Because, according to Ratcliffe, they did.

I think where we may differ here is in how this platform came to be chosen. But we don't really know that yet. You seem to think that Hegseth & Co. made this call independently of anything or anybody else. In fact, worse, they made that decision in defiance of policy.

Maybe they did. But, if so, why the CISA guidance? Why is CIA IT coming in and saying "Here you go Mike...this is called Signal."

We need to know how and why this platform was used. And we don't know that yet.

Why are we to believe anything that Racliff or this administration says on any of this stuff?

They've lost all credibility.
 
Gabbard said there was no classified intelligence information. She deferred to the others about defense info.
She was parsing the words. However, they did touch on human and/or signal intelligence which allowed them to identify the high value target's location. She's stretching the truth here.
 
Why would the encrypted app be on government phones if it wasn’t to share info thought to have some level of security.

This is the question that I'm posing too.

It seems like a key question: did the participants of this chat make concerted and deliberate efforts to evade government comms policies? Or were they using what was provided to them?

And, if it's not allowed, why is it provided to them? Why is CISA pushing it?

I guess we'll find all that out as things unfold.
 
Yeah, this is what I've been saying: they shouldn't have been on Signal (or any other public network).

So why the hell was CISA pushing it? Because they were. Why was the CIA installing it? Because, according to Ratcliffe, they did.

I think where we may differ here is in how this platform came to be chosen. But we don't really know that yet. You seem to think that Hegseth & Co. made this call independently of anything or anybody else. In fact, worse, they made that decision in defiance of policy.

Maybe they did. But, if so, why the CISA guidance? Why is CIA IT coming in and saying "Here you go Mike...this is called Signal."

We need to know how and why this platform was used. And we don't know that yet.
There's two other questions: (1) How many installed and used it on their private phones? Tulsi wouldn't answer the question, so we can probably have a good guess where that was installed; and (2) a record has to be kept of all documentation. The only record we have is from Goldberg. Apparently everyone else had their texts disappeared.
 
She was parsing the words. However, they did touch on human and/or signal intelligence which allowed them to identify the high value target's location. She's stretching the truth here.
Huh? Any body with a brain knows high value assets and targets are selected through intelligence. That is all she said.
 
I don't have any reason to disbelieve him.
I mean...I should say: that doesn't mean that I'm swallowing whole his claim about his staff installing the app for him. I'm just saying that there's no particular reason to think he's lying about that.

If he is, it ought to be pretty easy to sniff out. Just subpoena the guy who Waltz claims put it on there.
 
I'd like to know why CISA was recommending it. And why (at least in the case of Ratcliffe at the CIA) the agency was installing it. If Ratcliffe is right, the use of Signal wasn't some rogue decision on their part.
CISA has to authorize every application, unclassified or classified. They absolutely didn't recommend using it for sensitive or classified information. CISA recommends Microsoft Products for unclassified business too - Outlook, Word, Teams, etc., etc.

Yes, using Signal for sensitive and classified discussions and information is the very definition of going rogue. They did it just a couple of days after reminding all not to use Signal for sensitive and classified.
 
There's two other questions: (1) How many installed and used it on their private phones? Tulsi wouldn't answer the question, so we can probably have a good guess where that was installed; and (2) a record has to be kept of all documentation. The only record we have is from Goldberg. Apparently everyone else had their texts disappeared.

The app was set for the chat to disappear in a week.
 
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CISA has to authorize every application, unclassified or classified. They absolutely didn't recommend using it for sensitive or classified information. CISA recommends Microsoft Products for unclassified business too - Outlook, Word, Teams, etc., etc.

Yes, using Signal for sensitive and classified discussions and information is the very definition of going rogue. They did it just a couple of days after reminding all not to use Signal for sensitive and classified.
Didn't she fire a bunch of people for using Signal?
 
COH: “As anyone can see, this is clearly not entitled a ‘war plan’. Thus it is a big nothingburger served up by Democrats and their sponsor media.”
Hey just for reference. You koolaid drinkers might want to google Hegsheth, Rubio and Waltz comments on Hillary’s unsecured server which by the way had no classified info on it. Great stuff for hypocrisy lovers. Falling all over themselves saying she should be prosecuted when not a single one of the Signals ChT group has even apologized to the families of service members whose lives could have been put in danger. And the icing on the cake is that Witkoff was in Moscow when he was on the chat and we know the Russians were likely privy. But yeah a nothing burger.
Amazing how you folks in the cult will twist yourselves into pretzels to say nothing to see here. If an enlisted soldier had done this they immediately would have been court martialed and sent to Leavenworth.
Additionally, if they programmed the app to disappear, they broke the law regarding the Presidential Records Act. Even the National Review a very conservative publication is slamming them.
Interesting how when the news broke on Monday the Trump propaganda network’s(Fox) lead on the 6 pm broadcast was about the president’s portrait in the Colorado statehouse. In fact their 3 lead stories didn’t even mention the Signal Chat scandal. If a democrat administration did this exact thing, republicans would be calling for blood and we all know that’s fact whether they’d admit it.
On another note. Speaker Johnson yesterday floated the idea of getting rid of some federal courts. I’d bet that they’d be the ones that have had ruled against the administration recently. Yep democracy at its finest. Correction. Dictatorship at its finest.
Total violation. It's not even a question now. The link in the OP gets you to Atlantic's article with the entire chat with screenshots.

This all should have been on SIPR or better in a SCIF in person. Hegseth had to be getting the strike mission details from his SIPR device and then reposting it on Signal. Strike mission plans are always classified, typically Secret and sometimes Top Secret.

While there is no chance anyone will be charged, the law was indeed broken here.

The President should fire Waltz and Hegseth and distance himself from this and to show that he has at least some concern for protecting classified information.
Won’t happen. Waltz has learned a lesson was his response. American service members could have been put at risk. What if some were killed as a result of? Any punishment then. And the idea that Witkoff was actually in Moscow at the time he was on this chat is unconscionable. Fire him immediately for sheer stupidity. My brother was in the service and deployed in a war zone. Had this happened when he was still in my family would have been livid and letting the world hear our anger.
The DOD just sent out a department wide notice about not using the Signal app. Their arrogance is astonishing.
 
This is the question that I'm posing too.

It seems like a key question: did the participants of this chat make concerted and deliberate efforts to evade government comms policies? Or were they using what was provided to them?

And, if it's not allowed, why is it provided to them? Why is CISA pushing it?

I guess we'll find all that out as things unfold.
One last time, it's provided on unclassified and unsecure devices for unclassified/non-sensitive use. I know people aren't aware of how government IT works, but I'm telling you how it works and what CISA does. I'm providing actual honest facts here.
 
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