Russia-Ukraine war has begun
- Thread starter TheOriginalHappyGoat
- Start date
Ukraine's Zelenskyy says 3,000 North Koreans killed or wounded in Russia fighting
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said more than 3,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed or wounded fighting for Moscow in Russia's western Kursk region.
Jack Keene, General, US Army Ret., says there is a production capacity of 25 tanks to 100 tanks lost.
This is the one that died, right? Seems kind of suspicious.....
I've heard reports of them committing suicide, rather than be captured. Dear Leader would probably kill off their family if they were captured alive.
Well, it does matter if he lived, which I don't think he did.
Any captured N. Korean would be big propaganda value for Ukraine.
Wonder how many millions each of those ancient things are on the books for? Total money laundering/kickback operation. A 1960s surplus vehicle worth less than a new F150 sold for $20M, we send it at taxpayers expense after calling it aid and borrowing the money to make it happen. They (ukraine) will never pay it back, but instead grease palms in congress the executive branch and K street.
But we're creating jobs for the defense industry!
But we're creating jobs for the defense industry!
Watched the first one. Pretty cool. But HTF did the first house they picked have a woman who spoke perfect English? I smelll a rat.
The guide who got stuck was a hoot.
Looking forward to watching the second one when I get time.
I used to teach Security Cooperation to USG and partner nation civilian and military. This equipment is called Excess Defense Articles. The value for sell or grant transfer to a partner nation of those is considered 5 to 50 percent of the original cost depending on current condition. They’re usually so “as is” to partner nations. Sometimes they use them for spare parts for their existing equipment inventory. Sometimes they use them because they work or work after repair. Old IS equipment is in service all around the world even decades after we stopped using it.
Bottom line is the value of those per unit is not even a fraction of $20 million.
It's not that I don't believe you, but I'd like to see the actual numbers.
Hell, we drove jeeps and trucks from WWII in Germany in the early 70s. WWII was less than 30 years before then, which is kind of crazy to think about. Vietnam is 50 years ago today.....
Go to the DSCA website and look at the Congressional Notifications. You’ll see what we’re selling or grant transferring to partner nations and allies and the value of each transfer. Also how it’s paid for IIRC. You should find it interesting.
If you want to see how Excess Defense Articles work, look it up in the eSAMM on the same site. It’s searchable.
Also, the B52s are still in service going strong and everyone of them is decades older than the pilot and crew. Little of the original aircraft is still in them after all the refurbishments and upgrades.
Complaining about systematic targeting?
It is probably too late to make a difference now, but right after the election should Biden have named Trump a Special Envoy so he could legally start the negotiations? I don't see Ukraine suddenly gaining ground, in fact, they have been losing ground. Every week seems to make Russia a little bit better off in the negotiations.
I don't know..... they may be gaining some ground, but Ukraine is pretty entrenched in Kursk Oblast. And their drones are venturing farther into Russia.
I think their negotiating position is better than it was last summer, before they invaded Kursk
Sounds like the Ukrainians have had some kind of EW breakthrough that renders Russian drones useless.
Anyone know how the fiber optic cabling works to communicate with drones? Those are supposed to be 100% secure.
Is it that signals are coming up from the cable and can't be intercepted?
Fiber optic cables make any drone attached to them tethered … this is perhaps useful to monitor the front lines but won’t support any direct attacks. They are like Civil War era observation balloons.
Fiber optic links contain the signal in the cable and cannot be intercepted with an RF antenna. Likewise, a white out jammer cannot be constructed to disrupt the communications, as the cable jacket blocks incoming light waves.
A wide band RF jammer blocking all the (sub)channels isn’t hard to build once the signals intelligence identifies the center frequency and bandwidth. Any software defined radio kit would get that job done. Frequency hopping demands a wide band approach. The trick is the antenna design to accept the desired broadcast power and provide sufficient directionality and down range personnel safety.
(A directed beam RF transmitter can be considered a weapon of mass destruction when deployed as an anti personnel weapon).
Neither … but I’d bet I could pass the test, with some study.
ISW Recaps Russian 2024 Armor Losses
“Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[2]
Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[4] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[5] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[6] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.
Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[7] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[8] …
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025
“Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[2]
Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[4] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[5] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[6] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.
Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[7] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[8] …
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025
