I believe the legal argument was that Musk had too much influence over the board and it wasn't really independent. Not that it was too rich. He had his personal divorce attorney on the board, etc...
A company's board is supposed to negotiate at arm's length a deal with the executives. The dirty little secret in corporate governance is that this happens all too infrequently. Delaware VCs are VERY familiar with this. Musk assembled a board beholden to him, that he controls rather than the other way around, and who then "negotiated" this pay package. This isn't atypical--private company guys want to treat a public corp like their own company, while still tapping public securities funding. But if you want that money, you have to follow the rules.
Under Delaware law,, once you prove the board is compromised--NOT an easy task, let me tell you-- the burden for proving a transaction is fair shifts to the board/Musk. That is a pretty high burden (some call it outcome determinative--called "the entire fairness" doctrine) and that's what Musk fell into.
It is not unjust for shareholders to have legal rules in place that their board members serve the interests of the company, and not the CEO.
The decision is here:
posted online by Bloomberg News.
From the decision:
e. The Key Negotiators Said It All.
In the end, the defense witnesses said it all. Ehrenpreis and Gracias took the lead on the Grant for the Compensation Committee (recall that attendance at Working Group meetings was “optional” for Denholm and Buss).Maron was one of the primary go-betweens. When asked to describe the process, none viewed the process as an arm’s length negotiation. Each viewed it is as a form of collaboration with Musk.
See Julian v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 2008 WL 2673300, at *19 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008) (holding that the lack of historical precedent does not mean the size of the compensation plan can just be plucked out of thin air); Trial Tr. 1320:18–1321:16 (Murphy) (confirming that in a prior trial he testified that there should have been benchmarking for an executive if even he was the only person in the United States who was believed to be qualified and available to take that position). 725 JX-474 (6/30/17 email from Chang to Denholm and Buss). 726 See, e.g., JX-783 at 1–2 (1/16/18 email from Maron to the Compensation Committee) (stating Musk wanted that “[a]ny M&A in which [Tesla] buy a company for no more than 5% of [Tesla’s] current market cap will have no adjustment”); see JX-664 at 1 (11/9/17 email from Musk to Maron stating Musk would “like to take board action as soon as possible” on his compensation plan); JX-667 at 1 (11/12/17 email from Maron to Board stating: “We’d like to have another meeting on the issue of CEO compensation[.]”); JX-668 (11/14/17 email from Musk telling Maron to “pause for a week or two[,]” his compensation plan discussions); JX-718 (12/11/17 email stating the CEO compensation plan discussions are “back and on a fast track now”).
Ehrenpreis testified that “during the entire process, there were check-ins with Elon. We were not on different sides of things. We were trying to make sure if we were going to go through this exercise that he was on board.” Gracias explained his understanding of “fairness” in this context and his approach to the process as follows: [W]hat is important is that [CEOs] feel like they’re treated fairly. These plans are about incenting behavior. Behavior is a feeling. It comes from inside the mind. And so we focus on what’s fair and what feels fair to people and what’s fair to the shareholders, what’s fair to us as investors, what’s fair to the executives. That’s how we think about it. We never engage in these positional negotiations, I want 10, you want 3, let’s yell about it. That’s not how we do things, not how anyone does things.
That is, in lieu of objective market data and arm’s length negotiation, the Compensation Committee opted for subjective feelings—“what feels fair.” The committee did not take “positional negotiations” against Musk.
729 727 Ehrenpreis Dep. Tr. at 139:18–140:3 (emphasis added). 728 Trial Tr. at 808:16–809:14 (Gracias) (emphasis added). 729 Id.; see also Gracias Dep Tr. at 244:25–245:20 (“I did not have a positional negotiation with [Musk] about, hey, we want to give you one [tranche], and you want two and let’s go negotiate back and forth. . . . I did not have a negotiation starting lower and going higher with him about the tranches or the size of the award.”); id. at 255:22–256:9 (“Q. Okay. As a Tesla director and compensation committee member, do you think you have a duty to the company and the stockholders to try to negotiate for the smallest compensation package for Mr. Musk that would adequately incentivize him? A. That is not how I think about it, no. Q. Can you explain to me how you think about it? A. I think about compensation packages generally as what is fair to the executive and what is fair to the company. I don’t think about it as trying to get the very smallest thing possible ever. That’s just not my modus operandi with any company I deal with. I think about fairness.”).
Maron described the process similarly: “It was a cooperative, collaborative process. It wasn’t acrimonious. So when I say there wasn’t a conflict of interest, I think I’m thinking in my own mind was there an actual active conflict between the two parties; and I don’t think that there was. I think it was a cooperative collaborative process.” To deal with a conflict, one must first recognize a conflict. “Conflict blindness and its lesser cousin, conflict denial, have long afflicted the financially sophisticated.”731 Maron could not perceive the conflict, much less help deal with it.
The testimony from the key witnesses is perhaps as close to an admission of a controlled mindset as a stockholder-plaintiff will ever get. The Compensation Committee and Musk were not on different sides. They did not acknowledge the existence of a conflict. It was a cooperative and collaborative process.733