I have seen some comments about what all we did wrong, here is one:
— Retired Lt. Gen. DANIEL BOLGER, who commanded troops in Afghanistan: “There's more than enough blame to go around. All four presidential administrations (Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden) and the Congresses of 2001-2021 own a share. Generals and admirals — and I include myself — senior diplomats, and top intelligence leaders got it wrong over and over from start to finish. … Finally, the American people got it wrong. Our government, elected and appointed, works for us. We wanted a response to 9/11. We got that. Then we lost interest. The Taliban did not.”
There’s a reason for this consensus: A tacit acknowledgment that officials and national security professionals need a hard look in the mirror.
That includes presidents who launched and prolonged an ill-fated war; the generals who assured us success was always six months away; the civilians who believed diplomacy and development would transform Afghan society; the intelligence analysts who missed the Taliban’s true strength; the lawmakers who abdicated their oversight responsibility; the expert class who cheered on further bloodshed; the activists who minimized the consequences of withdrawal; and we in the media for keeping Afghanistan off the front page and prioritizing trivia over troops fighting and dying in battle zones.
Ghani was a huge problem. We too often believed what he and others inside the government told us. They told us they had the will of the people. We believed it. We also failed to understand how backing leadership that was openly corrupt would not work, the people knew he and others were ripping them off.
Two decades of mistakes, misjudgments, and collective failure
www.foreignaffairs.com
Yet even with these successes, we oversold the gains. And we did less than we could have about corruption, knowingly working with senior government and military figures that ordinary Afghans saw as responsible for graft and political and human rights abuses. Our counternarcotics program was an abject failure: poppy production continued to increase for most of the past decade, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimating a 37 percent
increase in acres under cultivation in 2020. The hope that Afghanistan’s economic growth would eventually allow the government to cover its own expenditures was advanced year after year at donors’ conferences, even though that clearly would not be the case for the foreseeable future. Grandiose projects languished: it took 15 years to install a new turbine on Kajaki Dam, a symbol of American largess toward Afghanistan in the 1950s.