. . . You would be wrong.
Yesterday, Judge Alikhan decided she can supersede the executive decisions of a President if she determines said decisions are “irrational or imprudent”. In other words, Presidential discretionary decisions are subject to whether a federal judge would agree. The judge did not rule based upon such mundane constitutional standards such as due process, scope of presidential authority, or the commerce clause. No she went to a new and broader standard of whether she thought the presidential decision was prudent or irrational. She used her personal political views, expressed as being rational and prudent to overrule the President. At issue was Trumps spending pause.
Oh, here she is denying she would use her personal beliefs to decide cases.
See
She was ruling on agency action (set up by Congress):
Under the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). To pass muster, the agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Agency action is generally deemed unlawful if it “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id.
. . .
Plaintiffs’ second claim argues that Defendants dramatically overstepped the bounds of their legal authority in ordering a nationwide funding freeze.12
Agencies “are creatures of statute” and are therefore subject to the limits prescribed by Congress. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022) (“OSHA”).
In other words, they “‘literally ha[ve] no power to act’ except to the extent Congress [has] authorized.” Marin Audubon Soc’y v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 121 F.4th 902, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (first alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289, 301 (2022)).
If an agency exceeds that power, the court must set aside its action under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
OMB’s organic statute is 31 U.S.C. § 503. Within it, Defendants primarily rely on subsections (a)(2) and (a)(5), but neither appears to grant the expansive authority that OMB tried to exercise here. Under subsection (a)(2), OMB may “[p]rovide overall direction and leadership to the executive branch on financial management matters by establishing financial management policies and requirements.” Id. § 503(a)(2). But providing overall direction and establishing financial management policies do not clearly confer the power to halt all finances, full-stop, on a moment’s notice. Indeed, the structure and provisions of Section 503 strongly suggest that OMB 12 As was the case at the TRO stage, a plaintiff who brings multiple claims only needs to show a likelihood of success on one of them to obtain injunctive relief. See Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 732 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C.), appeal filed, No. 24-7059 (D.C. Cir. 2024). In the interest of being thorough, the court will address each of Plaintiffs’ claims here. 31 Case 1:25-cv-00239-LLA Document 51 Filed 02/25/25 Page 32 of 39 occupies an oversight role. Defendants have not pointed to specific authority that allows it to unilaterally pull the plug on nearly all federal monetary flows.
