On December 13, 1968, Garrett Hardin's seminal paper on the inability of free communities to manage a finite resource was published. He described the now famous tragedy as such:
Although Hardin was most directly concerned with overpopulation in a world in which the cost of over-reproduction was not borne solely by the over-reproducing family, but rather an externality shared by the global community as a whole, his paper led to decades of research exploring the tragedy in uncountable contexts, ranging from resource management* to antibiotic overuse**.
For the anniversary, Science is publishing some thoughts from some of today's leading scholars, which include quite a few references to one of my favorite 20th Century IUB scholars, Elinor Ostrom (I worked at the Ostrom Workshop library while in college; it was where I was first introduced to the tragedy).
Hardin generally thought that the solution to the tragedy lie in allocating resources through one of two competing ideas: privatization or government regulation. Ostrom and others have since spent a lot of effort finding other solutions that don't require committing to one of these two extremes, highlighting how various cooperative schemes could successfully manage commons without the need to severely limit access to them through either private ownership or onerous regulation.
Hardin was a controversial figure. His pessimistic view of the commons led him to all sorts of distasteful ideas, such as overly strict immigration control and support for strong restrictions on reproduction. Many of his ideas were deemed overtly racist by others. But his famous paper did give rise to an entire subfield of ecological economics that continuously proves its increasing importance in our interconnected, global society.
* The collapse of the North Atlantic cod fishery was a classic example of individuals seeking to maximize their own gain collectively leading to community ruination.
** It is in each individual's interest to make use of antibiotics whenever available and effective, even if their collective use increases the spread of AMR over time.
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of –1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of –1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
Although Hardin was most directly concerned with overpopulation in a world in which the cost of over-reproduction was not borne solely by the over-reproducing family, but rather an externality shared by the global community as a whole, his paper led to decades of research exploring the tragedy in uncountable contexts, ranging from resource management* to antibiotic overuse**.
For the anniversary, Science is publishing some thoughts from some of today's leading scholars, which include quite a few references to one of my favorite 20th Century IUB scholars, Elinor Ostrom (I worked at the Ostrom Workshop library while in college; it was where I was first introduced to the tragedy).
Hardin generally thought that the solution to the tragedy lie in allocating resources through one of two competing ideas: privatization or government regulation. Ostrom and others have since spent a lot of effort finding other solutions that don't require committing to one of these two extremes, highlighting how various cooperative schemes could successfully manage commons without the need to severely limit access to them through either private ownership or onerous regulation.
Hardin was a controversial figure. His pessimistic view of the commons led him to all sorts of distasteful ideas, such as overly strict immigration control and support for strong restrictions on reproduction. Many of his ideas were deemed overtly racist by others. But his famous paper did give rise to an entire subfield of ecological economics that continuously proves its increasing importance in our interconnected, global society.
* The collapse of the North Atlantic cod fishery was a classic example of individuals seeking to maximize their own gain collectively leading to community ruination.
** It is in each individual's interest to make use of antibiotics whenever available and effective, even if their collective use increases the spread of AMR over time.
